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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE D. EYRE, Administrator 
of the Estate of CECIL DREWERY 
EYRE, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
MICHAEL FRANK BURDETTE, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 8829 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case as tried below involved two separate actions 
-one by George D. Eyre, Administrator of Cecil Drew-
ery Eyre, deceased, and the other by Lorene Massardi. 
Both Eyre and Massardi were riding in the defendant's 
vehicle at the time of the accident. Both actions were 
consolidated for trial and tried before a jury. Massardi 
admitted that she was a guest, but plaintiff Eyre claimed 
that he was a passenger for hire. The court ruled that 
Eyre also was a guest. Each plaintiff alleged that the 
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defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct and of intoxi-
cation. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant 
in both cases. Massardi accepted the verdict. The only 
appeal is by Eyre. 
Eyre was killed in a series of accidents involving the 
defendant's vehicle at about 6275 So. Redwood Road in 
Salt Lake County on Sept. 22, 1956 at about 7:19 P.M. 
(R. 2). The action was brought on behalf of the heirs, 
Iole Eyre, widow, and three children, Russell, age 31; 
Douglas, age 27; and Pat, age 2 5, all of whom were mar-
ried and living away from home (R. 1, 264-275~. Mr. 
Eyre was seriously injured in October, 1953, as a result 
of which he was permanently crippled. He received the 
sum of $6,500.00 in settlement for permanent disability 
on account of this accident from the California Indus-
trial Commission some time in June of 195 5 (R. 268-269). 
So far as Mrs. Eyre knew, Eyre didn't work following this 
injury (R. 269). Eyre and his wife quarreled about how 
the money was to be invested and Mrs. Eyre left her hus-
band and moved into an apartment (R. 270) . On August 
5, 19 55, Mrs. Eyre filed divorce proceedings in California 
against her husband, claiming that he had treated her in a 
cruel and inhuman manner. (Ex. D-25, R. 277-280). 
An interlocutory decree was entered on September 23, 
19 5 5, requiring the defendant to pay Mrs. Eyre alimony 
of One Dollar per month. The decree also provided that 
a final judgment could not be entered until one year from 
the entry of the interlocutory decree and that such final 
judgment would not be entered until requested by one of 
the parties (Ex. D-26, R. 280-281). The year would 
have expired the day following the accident. No final 
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judgment had, therefore, been entered. Mrs. Eyre could 
not state whether she intended to make the decree final 
or not (R. 271). She admitted that she and her husband 
had separated about five or six times before the divorce, 
the shortest period for possibly two weeks and the longest, 
about six months (R. 264.) She said that all of the sepa-
rations and the eventual divorce were caused by her hus-
band's drinking and quarrels resulting therefrom (R. 
274). Prior to their separation they split fifty-fifty the 
money which Eyre received for his permanent disability 
on account of the industrial accident (R. 275). From the 
time of their separation in July 19 55 to the date of her 
husband's death she never saw him again and they never 
corresponded with one another (R. 275 -276). She ad-
mitted that her husband never paid her any money, not 
even the One Dollar a month alimony, from the time of 
the separation down to the time of his death (R. 276). 
Mrs. Eyre was employed, earning $5 6.00 a week and 
had been so employed since 1941 (R. 272-273). Her hus-
band was good natured when he wasn't drinking, but 
uwhen he was drinking he was inclined to be quarrelsome" 
(R. 265, 266). 
Massardi was introduced to the defendant as the 
wife of Eyre (R. 300) and Massardi admitted that she had 
gone out with him since about June or July of 19 56. They 
had planned on selling the chickens, going to California, 
and getting married as soon as Eyre's divorce was final 
(R. 239). At the time of the accident Massardi was living 
at the American Motel and registered under the name of 
Mrs. Cecil Drewery Eyre (R. 240) . Eyre was 51 at 
the time of his death (R. 263). After separating from 
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his wife, Eyre raised some chickens on a farm owned by 
his sister in Draper (R. 272) . 
Massardi said that she and Eyre customarily went out 
to his sister's ranch in Draper every night to feed the 
chickens and gather eggs. Sometimes they went out twice 
a day. When they went into the B Z Bon the day of the 
accident, they were enroute to the ranch. (R. 2 3 8) . 
After they had been in the BZB awhile, Massardi men-
tioned they had better go because it was getting late, 
meaning that they still had to feed the chickens and gather 
the eggs the same as they did every night. Eyre had men-
tioned something to Burdett about selling him some eggs 
at a good price. When they left the B Z B, she and Eyre 
started to walk over to Eyre's car. The defendant left 
the tavern with them. His car was parked next to Eyre's. 
Massardi udidn't know at that time Mr. Burdett had a 
car." When they got to the cars, according to Massardi, 
Burdett said ((Let's go in mine," and so they got in his car 
( R. 2 3 0) . Massardi testified as follows ( R. 2 3 8) : 
uQ. Now, Mrs. Massardi, about these eggs, you 
and Mr. Eyre customarily went out there every 
night and got eggs and brought them in, did you 
not, and fed the chickens? 
A. Yes, - Sometimes went twice a day. 
Q. That is what you intended on doing when 
you left this B Z B, you were going out to feed 
the chickens and gather eggs. 
A. That is zuhat we intended doing when -u·c 
went to the B Z B, zucnt to get crates to put the 
eggs i 11 1uhc 11 zuc gathered tbe 111. 
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Q. When you left, Mr. Burdett was with you 
and Mr. Eyre and you started over to Mr. Eyre's 
car, and Mr. Burdett asked if you would go 1n 
his car, is that correct? 
A. He said ((let's go in my car." 
Q. That is all you know about the transaction 
going out there, you intended going out in you1,. 
own car and bringing the eggs back in? 
A. That is all I know." 
In addition to Massardi, the defendant was the only 
one who testified regarding the eggs. Defendant worked 
regularly at Eimco Corporation and had completed his 
work there on the day of the accident at 3 : 0 0 P.M. 
(R. 297). He worked part time as a bar tender at the B Z B 
Tavern, but had no regular working hours there (R. 296-
297). He checked every night to see if they wanted him. 
After finishing his regular work on the day of the acci-
dent he went to the B Z B Tavern to see if he was to work 
that night (R. 29 8) . He arrived there about 4: 3 0 P.M. 
The proprietor was not there. He waited for him and 
while doing so, saw Eyre and Massardi. He went over 
and Eyre introduced Massardi as his wife ( R. 29 9-3 0 0) • 
Massardi and Eyre were drinking beer and had a bottle 
in a wrapper on the floor. Defendant had two short 
beers with them (R. 300-301). 
During the conversation Eyre said he had some eggs 
for sale. The defendant said he ucouldn't use too many." 
The defendant and another bar tender agreed to take 
half a case between them and when the· proprietor came 
in, he indica ted he would take half a case ( R. 3 0 1 ) • Eyre 
indicated that he and Massardi uwere going out to get 
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the eggs." They had to feed the chickens. The eggs 
were to be delivered at the B Z B. Nothing was ever said 
about the defendant going out to get the eggs. As they 
were leaving, Eyre asked the defendant if he would like 
to go along. The defendant said he had some free time 
and would go. Eyre's car was by the door; the defendant's 
was around the corner. Defendant asked whose car they 
would go in, and mentioned that he had a full tank of gas, 
and they went in his car. He testified he had no other 
reason for going out there ((other than to look at the 
chicken farm," at Eyre's invitation (R. 303). He also 
testified that until Eyre invited him to go out to see the 
chickens, he was going home. Eyre never paid him for 
the ride. (R. 312). 
The defendant was questioned about his testimony 
given in a former hearing and the substance of this testi-
mony is set forth in the appellant's brief. However, 
Eyre's attorney did not read all of the testimony and the 
additional testimony was brought out on redirect exami-
nation as follows (R. 3 51): 
uQ. Mr. Burdett, counsel, Mr. Black, ques-
tioned you about your conversation about the eggs, 
but he didn't read you all of the testimony that was 
given at the previous hearing to which he referred, 
and I will ask you to state if this was also the testi-
mony which you gave at the hearing to which coun-
sel questioned you and if this is not part of the 
same conversation-this is at the bottom of page 8. 
uA. Well, Mr. Eyre, he asked if I would like 
to accompany them out to the ra1tch to get the 
eggs. I didn'~ have anything pressing at the time 
to do, so I told him I would be glad to and then I 
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asked him, (which car shall we take? Shall we go 
in mine or shall we go in yours,' and he said they 
would go in my car?" 
Is that what you testified about at the prior hear-
ing? 
A Y . '' . es s1r. 
The defendant testified that the price of the eggs 
was agreed upon and that whether the defendant went in 
his car or whether he went in Eyre's car or whether each 
went in his own car had no effect upon the price quoted 
(R. 3 51). 
When they reached the farm in Draper, the defendant 
actually gathered all of the eggs and, in addition, fed the 
chickens while Massardi and Eyre sat out in the car (R. 
307-308). 
The highway both north and south of Bennion Hill 
is about as described in the plaintiff's brief. The weather 
was clear. It was dark (R. 191, 223, 309). The posted 
speed limit at the scene of the accident was 50 mph. 
(R. 320). 
In support of the allegation of wilful misconduct, 
the plaintiffs offered testimony of certain witnesses to 
prove that the defendant's vehicle had been driven in an 
erratic manner and at an excessive speed up the south slope 
of Bennion Hill. Ed Jones and Clarence Lovendahl were 
in a vehicle which was preparing to enter the highway 
from a driveway on the east. Both testified that a 
light-colored Ford automobile passed going north. Jones 
estimated its speed at 60 to 70 miles per hour (R. 77). Lov-
endahl guessed the speed of this car at 70 miles per hour, 
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but readily admitted he was not a good judge of speed 
(R. 186-187). Both admitted that they did not actually 
see the accident. ( R. 18 3, 18 7) . Jones said it would 
be impossible to say that the vehicle which passed them 
was the defendant's car. (R. 183). Lovendahl like-
wise admitted that he could not identify the defendant's 
car as being the one whose movements he had observed. 
(R. 187). Both stated that the car which they observed 
went clear over to the west side of the road toward a 
cement culvert as it reached the brow of the hill (R. 183, 
187). Jones indicated that the car which he observed 
was not passing any northbound cars (R. 182). 
As a matter of fact, the defendant's car had actually 
passed two cars on the hill and was not more than a foot 
over the center line as it completed the passing of the last 
car and was not more than a foot over the center line 
as it went over the brow of the hill. Green testified that 
he was proceeding north and approaching the south side 
of Bennion Hill. He had just reached the point where 
the northbound road widened out into two lanes when the 
defendant's car passed him and then went back onto its 
own side of the road (R. 189) . Perry was traveling north 
up the south side of Bennion Hill. As he approached the 
crest of the hill, he was traveling in the outside northbound 
lane when the defendant's car passed him in the inside 
lane. In so doing the defendant's car did not go more 
than a foot over the center line and was not more than a 
foot over the center line as it went over the hill (R. 201). 
Regarding the actions of the defendant's car as it 
reached the crest of the hill and started down the north 
slope, Perry said that the defendant's car continued down 
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the hill on its own side of the road and then veered to the 
left just before the impact with the Giorgio car (R. 196-
197). He admitted that it was dark and that all of the 
cars had their headlights burning (R. 191) and claimed 
that the impact occurred in the southbound lane. He 
admitted that he was a half a city block away when the 
collision occurred and his observations were made from 
this point (R. 196, 197). 
Green testified that when he reached the top of the 
hill going north, the defendant's car was then on its own 
side of the road going down the hill. It looked to him 
like it barely edged to the east and then edged back and 
struck the Giorgio car (R. 189, 190). He admitted that 
he got to the brow of the hill just in time to see the acci-
dent (R. 19 5); that it was dark at the time (R. 194) and 
that at the time of the collision he was not quite a Salt 
Lake City block away (R. 193, 194). 
Gary Hensley and Fred H. Bailey were traveling south 
on Redwood Road. (R. 219, 223). Hensley was about 40 
to 60 feet behind the Giorgio car at the time of the acci-
dent (R. 221), yet he could not tell which vehicle was 
on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident 
(R. 222). Bailey was not quite a city block north of the 
accident when the collision took place between the Giorgio 
and the defendant's vehicles (R. 225). He said the dis-
tance was so great that he couldn't tell on which side of 
the road or where with reference to the center the accident 
occurred (R. 22 5, 226). 
Giorgio's testimony as to the position of the cars on 
the highway at the time of the accident was very incon-
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elusive. He never saw the defendant's car until he saw its 
headlights just an instant before the accident. He had no 
idea how far away the car was (R. 211) . 
uQ. As a matter of fact you didn't see the 
car you had the collision with until you saw the 
headlights, that is the first time you saw the car? 
A. Saw the headlights. 
Q. It was dark enough so you didn't see the 
car without those headlights, is that it? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, when you saw these headlights, 
how far away from you were they? 
A. I don't know. Everything went so fast 
I just saw the lights and tried to turn and bang, that 
is it. 
Q. You never saw these lights until you saw 
them the instant before the accident? 
A. That is right. 
Q. You haven't an idea how far away you 
were from it? 
A. No," (R. 211). 
He tried to turn right, but didn't know whether he 
got the car turned or not ( R. 211 ) . He could not say 
as to the position of the defendant's car or its lights on the 
highway (R. 212) . He guessed his own car was a foot 
or two west of the center of the road (R. 204). He testi-
fied that his car left no tire marks on the highway (R. 
210) , hut that fluid did leak from his power steering 
reservoir. (R. 209). 
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Burdett testified that he passed one northbound car 
as he was proceeding up the south side of Bennion Hill and 
passed another car near the top of the hill but did not go 
over the center of the road in so doing (R. 314, 315). As 
he came down the hill he was on his own side of the road 
in the inside lane and did not cross over the center line ( R. 
316, 317). He was traveling 50 miles per hour. Eyre 
and Massardi started to argue and were jostling him and 
interfering with his driving. He momentarily turned his 
head to ask them to stop. Then he saw the lights of a car 
coming toward him and the collision took place with the 
Giorgio car. His car was on its own side of the road at 
that time and he did not remember anything thereafter 
about any other accjdents. (R. 317). 
Massardi did not remember anything about the acci-
dent. (R. 231, 247). 
Arthur E. Allen, an investigating officer, gave as his 
opinion that the impact was approximately two feet into 
the southbound lane of traffic, basing the same on the 
fluid mark left by the Giorgio vehicle. (R. 170). !-low-
ever, he admitted on cross examination that in a former 
hearing involving this same subject matter, he testified that 
the mark was ((one foot west of the center line of the 
highway" (R. 172, 174). In this case he actually could 
not recall anything definitely except what his notes and 
diagram showed (R. 174)). He admitted that Exhibit 
No.1 was prepared by him and Deputy Gunn the next day 
following the accident when everything was fresh upon 
his mind (R. 168, 169). He admitted that the point of 
impact as shown on that exhibit was only one foot inside 
the southbound lane (R. 172). He said that the fluid 
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trom the power steering of the Giorgio car leaked out and 
left a mark upon the road, which was shown in Exhibit 
No. P-2. This was the only mark which he could identify 
as coming from the Giorgio vehicle (R. 170, 171) and 
was, therefore, actually the mark on which he based his 
measurement as to the point of impact. 
Lewis J. Uzelac, an automobile mechanic, testified 
that the power steering reservoir on a 1953 Roadmaster 
such as was being driven by Giorgio was actually located 
29% inches in from the outside edge of the left front 
fender. He also testified that it was 22Y2 inches from 
the outside edge of the fender to the nearest portion of any 
hose leading to or from the power steering reservoir (R. 
2 8 8, 2 8 9) . He further testified that such a car had an apron 
extending down from the inside edge of the fender toward 
the engine (R. 289) and that if any hose were broken, the 
fluid from the hose would run down the apron before 
dropping onto the ground (R. 289) . If any break oc-
curred in the hose, it could not be closer than 22 ~lz inches 
to the outside edge of the fender and that where the fluid 
could drop to the ground would be farther away from 
the fender than that (R. 292, 293). If the car was 
struck on the left side, the apron would be pushed closer 
in to the unit or engine and farther away from the 
wheel (R. 293). 
Thus the physical evidence showed that the left side 
of the Giorgio vehicle at the time of the accident was 
at least a foot east of the center line and into the north-
bound traffic lane because the officer indicated on his 
diagram that the fluid mark from the Giorgio vehicle was 
one foot west of the center line and the outside edge of the 
fender would be at least two feet further to the east. 
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The impact beetween the Giorgio and Burdett cars 
involved the left front and side of each vehicle. Both 
Giorgio and the defendant lost control of their vehicles 
following the initial impact. As a matter of fact, Giorgio's 
vehicle, according to officer Allen, traveled a distance of 
3 34 feet after the impact before stopping (R. 17 4 and Ex. 
I). 
Massardi testified she said something about the de-
fendant driving too fast and Eyre replied, ccDon't worry 
about that, he is a race car driver" (R. 231, 232). She did 
not know whether this remark was made going out to the 
ranch or coming back. (R. 248). 
On the issue of intoxication, Deputy Sheriff Allen 
said that he conversed with the defendant at the scene, 
could smell alcohol on him, and that he was irrational. 
He believed the defendant to be intoxicated. (R. 148) . 
Vasco Laub, a highway patrolman, said he conferred 
with the defendant on the night of the accident at about 
9:00 P.M. at the hospital (R. 257, 259). He inquired 
whether the defendant would be willing to submit to a 
blood alcohol test. The defendant allegedly said he 
wouldn't take a blood test until he could talk to his at-
torney (R. 260) . Laub then said: 
uQ. Now, I will ask while you were talking 
to Mr. Burdett, will you describe his appearance, 
or anything you noticed about him in regard to 
smell, or anything like that? 
A. Yes. After he technically refused to take 
a blood alcohol test I leaned close enough so I could 
smell his breath and observe his general condition, 
the condition of his eyes and his speech. I noticed 
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also an impairment of his speech, which I presumed 
to be permanent. He also had quite a bit of blood 
about his face; I could see he had been injured. I 
observed a rather strong odor of alcohol on his 
breath and his tongue appeared quite thick, and 
his eyes were quite blood shot." (Italics ours) 
(R. 261). 
He said he had made a study of intoxicants and their ef-
fect on people. In his opinion the defendant was intoxi-
cated (R. 262). 
The defendant admitted having only two short beers. 
(R. 300, 301). Massardi said she and Eyre observed that 
Burdett had two drinks of some alcoholic beverage from 
a glass while he was in the B Z B in their presence (R. 
242). She also admitted that she and Eyre had been with 
the defendant for approximately three hours prior to the 
time of the accident (R. 2 50) . 
Massardi testified that about 4:00 P.M. on the day of 
the accident she and Eyre went to a restaurant and had 
something to eat (R. 228). They also went to a liquor 
store where they purchased a pint of whiskey and a bottle 
of 7-Up. There was an empty 7-Up bottle in the car 
in which the whiskey and mixer was poured half full, and 
they drank the contents therefrom. They then went to a 
restaurant to pick up a crate in which to gather some 
eggs, and from there to the B Z B Tavern, where they 
each ordered a glass of beer. They were sitting at a table 
in the B Z B when the defendant came over to them (R. 
229). 
Defendant said that Massardi and Eyre were drinking 
beer at the B Z B. He said they had a bottle in a wrapper 
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on the floor (R. 3 00, 3 01). He said that after they left 
the B Z B, a fifth of whiskey was purchased at North 
Temple and Fifth West (R. 304). At Riverton, at Eyre's 
request, defendant bought a small bottle of mixer and gave 
it to Eyre (R. 3 06) . On the return trip, the defendant 
stopped in Riverton to buy another bottle of mixer for 
Eyre (R. 310) . Massardi did not know whether Eyre 
took the bottle of whiskey with them into the B Z B 
(R. 241). She admitted testifying in another proceeding 
that she could have drunk some alcoholic beverage on the 
trip from the B Z B to Draper and that she and Eyre 
could have had something to drink at the ranch (R. 246, 
247). She admitted testifying in a former trial that she 
had had a few drinks (R. 2 52) . 
In addition to the argument which defendant said 
took place between Eyre and Massardi just before the 
accident, defendant also testified that on the trip back 
from the ranch he had stopped for a semaphore in West 
Jordan and after he started up, Eyre and Massardi had 
argued. At that time he told them to stop so he could 
drive the car. They did, and he continued on north 
(R. 313, 314). Massardi at first denied that Eyre had 
made any statement that had caused an argument between 
them, but admitted testifying at a former hearing on 
that matter that Eyre might have made some remark on 
the way back that tnade her mad (R. 254, 25 5). 
The defendant testified that not only did he drive 
Eyre and Massardi out to the ranch, but on arrival there, 
he gathered the eggs and fed the chickens (R. 3 07, 3 08) . 
Neither Eyre nor Massardi at any time complained or pro-
tested about the nature of his driving the car or the man-
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ner in which he was handling it (R. 319) . He denied 
exceeding the speed limit (R. 3 20) . His lights were pro-
erly burning (R. 320). Traffic wasn't heavy in the 
direction in which he was proceeding (R. 327). Mass-
ardi would not deny that the defendant gathered the 
eggs (R. 244) or that he fed the chickens (R. 24 5.) 
She remembered testifying in a former trial that the de-
fendant was not driving in an erratic or reckless manner 
on the return trip (R. 248). 
ARGUMENT 
We will consider the plaintiff's points in the order 
set forth in the plantiff's brief. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLD-
ING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DE-
CEASED, CECIL DREWERY EYRE, WAS A GUEST 
IN THE BURDETT AUTOMOBILE. 
The plaintiff has cited numerous authorities holding 
that the compensation required to remove an occupant 
from the status of a guest does not need to be a monetary 
one, but that any tangible benefit which is the 1nOtivat-
ing influence for furnisbing the transportation is suffi-
cient. We have no quarrel with this statement of the law. 
However, in each of the cases cited, there was in fact not 
only an actual benefit to the driver, but that benefit was 
the motivating influence for the fur1tishing of the trans-
portation. We will not attempt to cover all of the cases 
cited in the plaintiff's brief because a reading of the brief 
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will clearly show that in the cases cited both factors were 
present. 
For example, in the Utah case of Jensen v. Mower, 
294 P. 2d 683, 4 Utah 2d 336, the defendant, prior to the 
accident, had posted on a bulletin board at Hill Field a 
notice that he wanted riders from Salt Lake City, in 
response to which the plaintiff contacted the defendant 
and was advised that the defendant charged $3.50 per 
week, which was the amount charged by the bus, and that 
the plaintiff would be required to pay whether he rode 
or not as long as the car went. In other words, as the 
Utah Supreme Court so aptly stated: 
ccin this case appellant did not offer to give 
respondent transportation from Salt Lake City to 
Hill field as his guest. APpellant 1nade it crystal 
clear that if respondent rode with him that it would 
be on the terms named by appellant for, the price he 
named and if respondent didn't like it he knew 
what he could do." (Italics ours). 
In Kruzie v. Sanders (Cal.), 143 P. 2d 704, the de-
fendant requested the plaintiff to accompany her on 
a shopping tour to assist in the selection of a ring as a 
present for defendant's husband and also for her help in 
choosing presents for some other girls. After nearly a 
week's urging, the plaintiff went with the defendant for 
this sole pur pose. 
The case of Crawford v. Foster (Cal.), 293 P. 841, 
involved a case where a salesman for the defendant auto-
mobile dealer was demonstrating a vehicle to the plaintiff 
as a prospective purchaser. 
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In Whitechat v. Guyette (Cal.), 122 P. 2d 47, the 
driver actually received money from an organization to 
which he and the plaintiff belonged to take the plaintiff 
and others to an organization meeting. 
In Druzanich v. Criley (Cal.), 122 P. 2d 53, the 
defendant's husband permitted her to use his car in going 
to a Union convention if the Plaintiff and others would 
help in the driving, which they agreed to do. 
In Walker v. Adamson (Cal.), 70 P. 2d 914, the 
plantiff and defendant were business associates and owned 
property on Lake Tahoe which they rented out. The 
purpose of the trip was to take hardware and other ma-
terials to carpenters who were doing construction work 
on the property. The defendant took his car and the 
plaintiff furnished part of the expenses. 
In Gillespie v. Rawlings (Cal.), 317 P. 2d 601, the 
sole purpose for which the plaintiff was riding in the 
defendant's car was to familiarize herself with the de-
fendant's business so that she could talk intelligently with 
defendant's customers. 
In Roberts v. Craig (Dist. Ct. of App. 1st Dist. Div. 
1, Cal.), 268 P. 2d 500, the plaintiff, a licensed driver, was 
riding in the defendant's vehicle at his request because 
defendant only had a learner's permit and the law required 
her to have a licensed driver in the car when she drove. 
In Russell v. Pilger (Vt.), 37 A. 2d 403, the plaintiff, 
a law officer, was riding in the defendant,s milk truck to 
protect him during a milk strike. 
In Wittrock v. Newcom (Iowa), 277 N. W. 286, 
the defendant, an auto salesman, requested the plaintiff 
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to accompany him to assist in selling a car to the plaintiff's 
brother. 
An analysis of each case cited by plaintiff clearly 
shows that the plaintiff in each case was requested by the 
defendant to accompany the defendant for a specified pur-
pose which was the motivating influence of the trip. 
Neither we nor the trial court contended that the 
compensation must be in money. Both recognized that 
there must be a tangible benefit to the defendant and that 
such benefit must be the motivating influence of t!Jc trip. 
The plaintiff had the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the affirmative allegation in the com-
plaint that the deceased Eyre was a passenger for hire. See 
Ames v. Seibert (Ohio), 99 N. E. 2d 905; Miller v. Miller 
(Ill.), 69 N. E. 2d 878; Pilcher v. E.rny (Kan.), 124 P. 
2d 461. 
It was and is our position that the plaintiff, as a mat-
ter of law, failed to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that there was any tangible benefit to the defendant; 
or, if there was any such benefit, that it was the motivating 
influence of the trip. It was upon this basis that the 
trial court ruled that Eyre was a guest. 
The only evidence presented in the case on the pur-
pose of the trip or the sale of eggs was that given by 
Massardi and the defendant. The d~fendant positively 
testified that he had purchased a quarter of a case of eggs 
from the deceased Eyre which were to be delivered to him 
by Eyre at the B Z B Tavern (R. 303). The remaining 
three-quarters of the case of eggs was admittedly pur-
chased by another bar tender and the proprietor of the 
bar. The defendant said it made no difference on the price 
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whether he drove out to the ranch and picked them up 
or in whose car they might have gone (R. 3 51) . De-
fendant intended on going home until the deceased Eyre 
invited him out to the ranch. Having time on his hands, 
he decided to go ( R. 3 0 3, 3 12) . Massardi did not refute 
any of these statements. 
In order to prove that the deceased Eyre was a pas-
senger for hire, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that in selling the 
eggs to the defendant and as a condition thereof, it was 
agreed that the defendant would drive Eyre out to the 
ranch and get the eggs. To say the least, the proof would 
have to show some request by defendant that Eyre ac-
company him so that he could get the eggs. Such is the 
reasoning back of all of the authorities cited in the plain-
tiff's brief. There was not one scintilla of evidence to 
show that, as a part of the purchase price, the defendant 
had to drive the deceased Eyre out to the ranch to get 
the eggs or even requested Eyre to go with him for this 
purpose. In fact, all of the evidence proved directly to 
the contrary. In the first place, Massardi said she and 
Eyre went out to the ranch every day to feed the chickens 
and gather eggs (R. 238). They were enroute to the 
chicken farm to gather eggs and feed the chickens when 
they stopped in at the B Z B Tavern. This was their 
intention before anything was said about the sale of eggs. 
Massardi didn't even know the defendant had a car 
when the three of them left the tavern (R. 230). When 
they left the tavern, according to Massardi, it was their 
intention of going in Eyre's car (R. 23 8). Her testimony 
definitely fails to show that the sale of eggs had anything 
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to do with the trip, or was part of the purchase price, or 
in any event the motivating influence for the defendant 
taking Eyre in his car, or even that the defendant made 
any request that Eyre accompany him so that he could 
get the eggs. In the second place, Mrs. Massardi testified 
that when the three of them left the tavern, she and Eyr'e 
walked over toward Eyre's car and the defendant totvard 
his and that the defendant then invited them to go in his 
car (R. 230): 
u.A. Well, I don't know just how long we 
were in there, we then started to leave and went 
outside, and Mr. Eyre and I started to his car, Mr. 
Burdett's was parked next to it, I didn't know at 
that time Mr. Burdett had a car. He said to Jack 
(let's go in mine,' so we got in his car and went." 
Ohviously, if one of the terms of the sale and pur-
chase of the eggs was that the defendant had to drive 
the deceased Eyre out to the ranch to get the eggs, or 
if defendant had requested Eyre to accompany him, Eyre 
and Massardi would have gone direct to the defendant's 
car. In the third place, the defendant testified that the 
price had been agreed upon and that the eggs were to be 
delivered by Eyre to the B Z B Tavern. In the fourth 
place, as they were leaving the tavern, and got to the 
door, Eyre asked if the defendant would like to go along 
(R. 303). This certainly negatives any duty on the part 
of the defendant to pick up the eggs or that the defendant 
had even requestd Eyre to accompany him for that pur-
pose. 
The fact that there may have been a business trans-
action between the deceased Eyre and the defendant rela-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
tive to the sale and purchase of eggs cannot in and of 
itself transform what otherwise was a purely social trip 
into a business venture unless the trip itself was agreed 
upon as a part of the purchase and sale of the eggs. See 
Ames vs. Seibert (Ohio), 99 N. E. 2d 905. In that case 
the plaintiff had driven his car from his home to Beach 
City where his father resided and was enroute to Wilmot, 
a village about three and a half miles beyond Beach City, 
to take his car there to have it repaired by a friend, Sei-
bert. The plaintiff had his father follow him to Wilmot 
in order to drive him back to Beach City after he had de-
livered the car to Seibert. A conversation ensued be-
tween the plaintiff and Seibert about the repairs, in which 
the plaintiff stated that he would like to have the repairs 
completed the next day. Seibert indicated that if the 
plaintiff would help him tear down the car that evening, 
he would have it fixed for him. The plaintiff said he 
would help tear it down, whereupon Seibert told the 
plaintiff's father to go home and that he, Seibert, would 
bring the plaintiff home after they were through work. 
Pursuant to this conversation and after the car had been 
torn down, Seibert started to drive the plaintiff back to 
Beach City when an accident occurred in which Seibert 
was killed and the plaintiff injured. The plaintiff brought 
an action against Seibert's estate for the injuries sustained. 
Plaintiff claimed that he was a passenger. for hire because 
his aid and assistance in working on the car was for Sei-
bert's benefit, and that in return for this benefit, Seibert 
had agreed to drive the plaintiff home. In holding that 
the plain tiff, as a matter of law, was a guest, the Ohio 
Appellate Court stated that it was uincumbent upon the 
plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
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he had paid or furnished to Seibert some pecuniary con-
sideration for his transportation, as such." 
uDid this arrangement create a contract for 
transportation with payment therefor? In the 
opinion of this court it did not. If Seibert had re-
quested Ames to help him tear down the car of a 
third person for which Seibert was to receive the 
entire payment for repairs, a different question 
would be presented. Here, there 1vas no evidence 
that an agreed lump sum payment was to be made 
by Ames to Seibert for tbe repair. of the car or that 
Ames was to be repaid a portion of such contract 
price for his assistance. Such evidence was neces-
sary to show that Ames was to be compensated by 
Seibert for Ames' assistance. The evidence does 
not show the rendering of any service to Seibert by 
this arrangement. In fact, the arrangement was 
made so that Ames could have his own car by the 
next evening, and, his service, if any, was con-
tributed to the repair of his own car for that pur-
pose. Furthermore, the statement of Seibert to 
Ames' father that he should go home and not wait 
for Ames, and that he, Seibert, would bring Ames 
home, raises an inference that Seibert was making 
the trip to accommodate the father. At any rate 
there was no evidence or inference of fact to the 
effect that either Ames or Seibert had formed any 
intent that Ames was to compensate Seibert for 
this short ride of three or three and a half miles. 
The most that can be inferred from the testimony 
is that Seibert took Ames home as a courtesy be-
tween friends. There is no evidence to prove a con-
tract to pay for transportation and the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict should have been 
sustained." (Italics ours) 
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SeealsoPilcherv. Erny (Kan.), 124P. 2d 461. The 
plaintiff was a seamstress whom the defendant had invited 
to accompany him on a trip to Stafford, prior to which 
time the defendant had left a coat with the plaintiff in 
order that she might fix it for him. When the defendant 
called for the coat, he offered to pay her the agreed charge 
of $1.2 5 therefor, but the plaintiff refused to accept 
any money saying that she would let the cost of 
repairs go on her expenses on the contemplated trip. 
The plaintiff sustained injuries on the trip, for which 
she sued the defendant. The plaintiff contended 
that the benefit which she had given the defendant 
of not charging him for the re pairs to his coat made 
her a passenger for hire. The defendant argued that 
the real motivating cause of having the plaintiff in 
his car was a desire on his part to be accommodating and 
to extend a courtesy to her; that the transaction with ref-
erence to the coat was only incidental. A judgment had 
been entered in favor of the plaintiff which was reversed 
by the appellate court with directions to enter judgment 
for the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff had 
the burden of establishing that she was a passenger for 
hire and that as a matter of law the payment was not the 
motivating cause for the trip. 
See also Melcher v. Adams (Ore.) , 146 P. 2d 3 54. In 
that case the plaintiff, who was a friend of the defendant, 
had been invited along for a ride. The plaintiff actually 
helped the defendant lift certain gear in and out of the 
automobile and contended that it was a benefit, which 
took him out of the guest statute. The Oregon Supreme 
Court in the course of its opinion said: 
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uThe: supreme court of the state of Wash-
ington has adopted the rule that in order to take 
out of the guest category one who rides in the 
motor vehicle of another, <two requirements are 
necessary: ( 1) An actual or potential benefit in 
a material or business sense resulting or to result 
to the owner, and ( 2) that the transportation be 
motivated by the expectation of such benefit' ::- * * 
((Upon consideration of the entire evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we are 
of the opinion that the assistance which the plain-
tiff rendered the defendant in helping him lift the 
gear into and out of the automobile was not a sub-
stantial benefit to the defendant in a material or 
business sense; and that the expectation of such 
act of the plaintiff was not the defendant's reason 
for inviting the plaintiff to drive to the beach, nor 
was it the plaintiff's purpose in accompanying the 
defendant." 
There is no disagreement among the authorities as 
to the general principles governing the determination of 
one status as guest or passenger. The courts generally hold 
that a mere incidental benefit resulting to the driver from 
the transportation is not sufficient to enlarge his liability, 
but that the benefit must have been given as consideratio11, 
for the transportation and, in some degree at least, have 
induced the defendant to extend the offer. 
In this case the sale of the eggs and purchase price, 
according to the evidence, had already been agreed upon 
before there was any discussion about riding to the ranch. 
The plaintiff failed to prove that as a part of the con-
sideration for the purchase of the eggs the defendant had 
to drive Eyre out to the ranch. The lower court had no 
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alternative but to find that the deceased Eyre was a guest. 
Jurors cannot resort to speculation and conjecture. To 
have submitted Eyre's status as passenger or guest to a 
jury under the evidence. in this case would have been 
clearly error. The jury could not possibly have found 
that part of the consideration for the purchase of the eggs 
was the defendant's driving Eyre out to the ranch, or 
that the defendant requested Eyre to accompany him so 
that he could get some eggs. 
Plaintiff in his brief argues that getting the eggs that 
night and at a favorable price was a substantial enough 
benefit for the defendant to have considered it worth his 
time in driving out to get the eggs. What the defendant 
may have considered as being a benefit to him is of no 
concern. The question is, was the getting of the eggs on 
that night and at that price the motivating influence for 
the trip? O·n this the plaintiff failed to produce any evi-
dence. There was no evidence that the defendant ever 
wanted the eggs that night, or requested Eyre to accom-
pany him for that purpose. If the defendant had wanted 
the eggs that night it was still not necessary for him to 
drive Eyre. Eyre was already going out to the ranch in his 
own car. What possible difference could it have made to 
the defendant whether he went with Eyre, or Eyre with 
him, or whether they went in their own cars. Further-
more, the only testimony in the case is that it was Eyre 
who invited the defendant. There is absolutely no evi-
dence that the defendant requested Eyre to accompany 
him so that he could get the eggs that night. Any benefit 
to the defendant was purely incidental. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
Plaintiff also argues that there was no social purpose 
whatsoever in this trip because they were not very well 
acquainted with one another. Such an argument might 
have more appeal in a case where there had been no drink-
ing. It is common knowledge that people who are drink-
ing in taverns become more sociable with one another and, 
in fact, very friendly with persons with whom they may 
have even slight or no acquaintance. Furthermore, even 
though there was no social purpose involved, this in and 
of itself would not make the deceased Eyre a passenger for 
hire. It was still incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove 
that the furnishing of the eggs to the defendant was the 
real motivating influence of the defendant's taking de-
ceased Eyre out to the ranch. Reference is made in the 
plaintiff's brief to the fact that at a former hearing the 
defendant did not make any statement that he was inter-
ested in going out to see the farm. Ho~rever, in this con-
nection the plaintiff's attorney quoted only a portion of 
the testimony given by the defendant in the former trial. 
The defendant also testified in that former hearing, in 
response to question from plaintiff's counsel: 
((Well, Mr. Eyre, he asked if I would like to ac-
company them out to the ranch to get the eggs. I 
didn't have anything pressing at the time to do so I 
told him I would be glad to and then I asked him, 
(which car shall we take? Shall we go in mine or 
shall we go in yours,' and he said they would go in 
my car." (R. 351). 
The defendant's testimony at the former trial, there-
fore, clearly indicated that he had been invited by the 
deceased Eyre to go to the ranch and that he accepted the 
invitation. It did not establish any contract and certain-
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ly, by no stretch of the imagination, could show that the 
purchase of the eggs was the motivating influence of the 
trip. The only reason for his going, as he testified in the 
former hearing and at this trial, was because he was invited 
by the deceased Eyre to accompany him and not because 
there was any obligation on him, nor because he had re-
quested Eyre to accompany him so that they could pick 
up the eggs. 
Not only did the plaintiff fail to prove that any 
benefit to the defendant was the motivating influence of 
the trip, but he also failed to prove that the defendant re-
ceived any benefit from the trip. The purchase price of 
the eggs had already been agreed upon before any invitation 
was extended. This is clear from both Massardi and the 
defendant's testimony because when they left the tavern, 
Massardi and Eyre walked over to Eyre's car and the 
defendant to his, and it was only then that there was any 
discussion about whose car they would ride in and it clear-
ly could not have been part of any business transaction. 
The sale of the eggs had been complete and was agreed 
upon. Thereupon Eyre asked the defendant if he would 
like to go out with them. The defendant then suggested 
they go in his car. He received no benefit whatsoever. He 
would have got the eggs and for the same price whether he 
went out or not. Actually, the benefit was all the other 
way. Eyre had to go to the ranch anyway, and on arrival 
at the ranch the defendant had to gather all of the eggs and 
feed the chickens. 
Plaintiff states that it is a known fact that persons 
will travel many miles to participate in a bargain sale. 
\V" e serious! y doubt that anyone could sustain any benefit 
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from the purchase of a quarter of a case of eggs if he had 
to drive out to Draper and back from Salt Lake City to 
get them and, in addition, while there, feed the chickens 
and gather the eggs. 
In this case the plaintiff failed to establish that the 
defendant received any benefit or, if any benefit was 
received, the plaintiff completely failed to establish that 
such benefit was the motivating influence of the trip. The 
primary purpose of the trip to the farm was to enable Eyre 
and Massardi to feed the chickens and gather the eggs as 
they always did. The defendant was invited to accom-
pany them, and as an act of courtesy offered to take his 
car. The fact that he might get the eggs that night was 
purely incidental. There was no testimony that he needed 
or even wanted them that night. And there was no 
thought of his ever going to the farm until he was invited 
by Eyre to do so. Since the plaintiff had the burden of 
proving not only a benefit to the defendant, but that such 
benefit was the motivating influence of the trip, the lower 
court properly held that the deceased Eyre was a guest. 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTIO,N NO. 15 PROPERLY ALLOWED 
THE. JURY TO CONSIDER ALLEGED SCUFFLING 
BY DECEDENT AND ANOTHER OCCUPANT AS A 
DEFENSE. 
There was evidence in the case that just prior to the 
accident the decedent and Massardi started arguing and 
scuffling so as to interfere with the defendant's operation 
of the car; that he momentarily turned just long enough 
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to tell them to stop when he saw the Giorgio automobile 
coming toward him (R. 317). Massardi admitted that 
Eyre may have said something that made her mad (R. 254, 
2 55). She did not otherwise refute the defendant's testi-
mony as to the scuffling and seemed to remember very 
little of what happened. Mrs. Eyre testified that she and 
her husband had separated four or five times prior to 
their divorce, and that the reason both for the divorce and 
the separations was her husband's drinking and that when 
he drank, 4e became quarrelsome. (R. 265, 266, 274). 
There was evidence that all three parties had been drink-
ing prior to the accident. 
The plaintiff attempted to prove and argued to the 
jury that the impact between the Giorgio and the defen-
dant's car occurred when the defendant's vehicle was par-
tially on the wrong side of the road. Two objections are 
made to the instruction, the first, that since the defendant 
testified the accident occurred on his own side of the road, 
the scuffling could not have caused him to go on the 
wrong side of the road; the second, that since the defendant 
stated the oncoming car turned into his car suddenly, he 
did not have time to do anything about it. The plaintiff 
then says that any Jcuffling had nothing to do with the 
accident. We would agree with the plaintiff, if the plain-
tiff would admit that the accident occurred on the de-
fendant's side of the road and that the Giorgio car turned 
suddenly into the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff did 
not so admit but, in fact, claimed that. the accident oc-
curred on Giorgio's side of the road and that Giorgio did 
not swerve over toward the defendant. An issue was, 
therefore, presented to the jury as to whether the defen-
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dant did cross over onto the wrong side of the road or 
whether Giorgio turned over onto the defendant's side of 
the road. Obviously, the defendant was entitled to have 
the jury instructed on all phases of the case. If the jury 
found, as the plaintiff contended, that the defendant 
edged or turned over onto the wrong side of the road, then 
the jury was entitled to consider whether such edging or 
turning was proximately caused by the scuffling that took 
place between Massardi and the deceased. The plaintiff 
cannot accept the defendant's testimony as true and 
undisputed on this point, when his whole case was based 
on the exact opposite of what the defendant said. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY O·N DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE. 
The plaintiff complains that the court should not 
have defined negligence, since negligence was eliminated 
as a basis of recovery_ 
Instruction No. 4 was a stock instruction in which 
the court defined the terms negligence, contributory neg-
ligence, ordinary care, and proximate cause. It was, of 
course, necessary to instruct the jury as to the meaning 
of wilful misconduct. This was covered in the court's 
instruction No. 5 wherein the court properly instructed 
as follows: 
c:c (Wilful misconduct' connotes a greater 
wrongdoing than mere negligence. As used in 
these instructions it means intentional wrongful 
conduct, done with knowledge that serious injury 
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to the guest is a probable result. It involves de-
liberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing 
or omitting to do an act with knowledge that in-
jury is likely to result therefrom." (Italics ours) 
This definition was approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P. 2d. 594, 118 
Utah 237. The first sentence of that instruction refers 
to the term ((negligence" and states that wilful miscon-
duct connotes a greater wrongdoing than mere negli-
gence. Obviously, if this sentence of the instruction is to 
have any meaning to the jury, negligence must be de-
fined. In instruction No. 16 the court instructed the 
jury that even if it should find that the defendant was 
negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause 
of the accident, this was not sufficient-that the jury 
must find that the defendant was guilty of wilful mis-
conduct or intoxication. Again, if that instruction was 
to have any meaning the jury must know the definition 
of negligence. In other words, how could a jury decide 
that the defendant's conduct was only negligent as dis-
tinguished from wilful misconduct without knowing what 
negligence was? The definition of negligence was not 
extraneous to the issues and evidence. 
Under this point the plaintiff also excepts to the 
court's Instruction No. 7 wherein the court instructed 
that it was the duty of a driver to keep a lookout, to keep 
his car under control, to drive on his own side of the high-
way, and to maintain a safe speed, the court adding that a 
violation of any of these requirements would constitute 
negligence. The court then stated that in order for the 
plaintiff to prevail on his claim of wilful misconduct he 
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had the burden of proving that the aforementioned acts of 
negligence were committed under such circumstances as 
to constitute wilful misconduct. This instruction em-
bodied the substance of the language Judge Wade used 
in his dissenting opinion in Esernia v. Overland Moving 
Co., 206 P. 2d 621, 115 Ut. 519, wherein he said: 
uunder such a state of facts, in my opinion, it 
became a question for the jury to determine 
whether such negligence was wilful misconduct 
as required under our guest statute for recov-
ery * * * ." 
Under this point complaint is also made of the court's 
Instruction No. 11 to the effect that conduct arising 
from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or from 
error of judgment, standing alone, did not indicate wilful 
misconduct. This instruction is likewise a proper state-
ment of the law. In the case of Ricciuti v. Robinson, 269 
P. 2d 282, 2 Utah 2d. 45, the Supreme Court cited with 
approval the cases of Bashor v. Bashor (Colo.) , 8 5 P. 2d 
732; Neyens v. Gehl (Iowa), 15 N. W. 2d 888; and Rindge 
v. Holbrook (Conn.), 149 A. 231, in each of which it was 
held that mere momentary thoughtlessness or inadvertence 
did not constitute wilful misconduct. In the Bashor case 
the driver, while traveling 45 to 55 miles per hour, momen-
tarily withdrew his attention from the road while turning 
a radio dial. In the Neyens case the driver, while traveling 
at a speed of 50 to 60 miles per hour, sought to retrieve 
a lighted cigarette he had dropped. In the Rindge case 
the driver momentarily lost control when a bee flew in 
the car. The same principle was applied in the Ricciuti 
case by our Supreme Court when the driver lost control 
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of his car while attempting to retrieve a lighted cigarette 
which had fallen on the mouth of his girl friend, who 
was sleeping with her head on his lap. This instruction 
was proper in view of defendant's testimony that when 
Massardi and Eyre started to scuffle, he momentarily 
turned toward them to tell them to stop. 
See also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
and Practice, Part 1, Section 2322, at page 379, wherein 
it is said: 
ccConduct arising from a merely momentary 
thoughtlessness or inadvertence or from an error 
of judgment does not manifest a reckless disregard 
for the rights of others so as to serve as a basis for 
recovery by an injured automobile guest." 
And also at page 3 86 where it is said: 
uMere negligence is not sufficient, nor is mo-
mentary thoughtlessness or inadvertence, * ::· * ." 
There was no confusion in the court's instructions. 
The same properly submitted to the jury the distinction 
between negligence and wilful misconduct, together with 
a definition of what did and did not constitute wilful 
misconduct and that the plaintiff could not recover upon 
a mere showing of negligence. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
ON THE ISSUE OF INTOXICATION. 
Under this point no complaint is made as to the 
definitio'n of intoxication, but because the court instructed 
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that one who was driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor is guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law. The court had, however, made it clear in Instruc-
tion No. 1 that the plaintiff Eyre claimed that the de-
fendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
which was denied by the defendant, and in Instruction 
No. 7 had clearly instructed that under the guest law a 
guest could recover where the driver was intoxicated. 
Again in that instruction the court outlined the plaintiff 
Eyre's claims and specifically stated: ((If the plaintiffs 
should prevail in your finding as to either the issue of 
intoxication or that of wilful misconduct as a proximate 
cause of injuries or damages suffered by them, they will 
be entitled to recover damages ~· ~to ~z- ." 
Again in Instruction No. 16, although the court in-
structed the jury that mere negligence was not sufficient 
on which to base a recovery, the court specifically in-
structed that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover if the 
defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct or was intox-
icated. Certainly, considering the instructions as a whole, 
there could be no question in the jury's mind that it could 
find for the plaintiff if it believed the defendant to be 
intoxicated. This is further indicated by the court's in-
struction No. 14 to the jury that a guest who rides in a 
vehicle, knowing or having reason to know, that the 
driver is intoxicated, assumes that hazard and cannot in 
that event recover from the driver's intoxication. 
POIINT v 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT .COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERRO·R IN ALLO·WING THE DEFENSE 
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OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO BE GIVEN TO THE 
JURY OR IN UNDULY EMPHASIZING THE SAME. 
There are two phases to the court's instructions on 
assumption of risk as set forth in the plaintiff's brief. 
One as to intoxication and the other as to wilful miscon-
duct. 
On the first issue the court in Instruction No. 14 
said in substance and effect that a guest who knows or 
reasonably should know that the driver is intoxicated, 
assumes the hazard resulting from the driver's intoxica-
tion. Also, that if, having entered a vehicle, a guest learns, 
or reasonably should be aware, that the driver is intoxi-
cated, and having a reasonable opportunity to alight at 
a reasonably safe place, fails to do so, the guest then as-
sumes the risk incident to the driver's intoxication by 
continuing to ride in the car. There can be no question 
that this instruction contains a proper statement of the 
law. It is in substance and effect the same principle as 
involved in the Esernia v. Overland Moving Company 
case, 206 P. 2d 621, 115 Ut. 519, wherein the Supreme 
Court held that guests who were aware of the driver's 
drowsiness when they accepted the ride and further when 
the truck ran off the road the first time and who had 
no opportunity thereafter to leave when the truck stopped 
at other points, had assumed the risk as a matter of law. 
The evidence in this case on the intoxication of the 
parties was conflicting. The defendant admitted having 
consumed only two short beers (R. 300, 301). Massardi 
testified that she and Eyre saw Burdett have two glasses 
of alcoholic beverages to drink. She could not state 
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whether the drink was whiskey or beer (R. 242). How-
ever, with reference to the defendant's condition, the 
plaintiff had two peace officers positively testify that 
the defendant was intoxicated. (R. 148, 259, 261). The 
evidence showed without dispute that Massardi and Eyre 
had purchased a pint of whiskey before joining the de-
fendant and had each drunk some of the whiskey before 
joining him. (R. 229). The defendant testified that 
they brought this whiskey into the B Z B Tavern with 
then1. (R. 3 00, 3 01). He also testified that after the 
three of them left the tavern, he purchased a fifth of 
whiskey at the instance of the deceased Eyre (R. 3 04) 
and thereafter purchased mixer on the trip down at Riv-
erton (R. 306) and another bottle of mixer on the trip 
back (R. 310) . Massardi admitted that she testified in a 
previous hearing she had had a few drinks and that there 
rna y have been other drinking ( R. 2 52) . 
Counsel in his brief argues that the deceased Eyre 
had no notice of the drinking on the part of the de-
fendant, particularly because the defendant testified under 
oath that he was sober. This argument might have sound-
ed a truer note if the plaintiff had not attempted to 
prove by two witnesses that the defendant was not sober 
but was, in fact, intoxicated. With such testimony cer-
tainly the jury could have found that the defendant was 
intoxicated, notwithstanding his own testimony that he 
was sober. This was exactly what· the plaintiff sought to 
have the jury do. The evidence clearly shows that both 
the deceased Eyre and Massardi were in the presence of 
the defendant continuously for approximately three hours 
prior to the time of the accident, during all of which time 
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they clearly had an opportunity to observe what alcohol 
he may have consumed. If two investigating officers who 
only saw the defendant for a few minutes after the acci-
dent could positively state that he was intoxicated, then 
both the deceased and Massardi, who had been with him 
continuously for three hours prior to the accident, either 
knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have 
known of the intoxication. 
We did not take the position in the trial below, nor 
do we now take the position that the defendant was per-
fectly sober. We then stated to the jury and so state now 
that possibly there was more drinking than either of the 
parties admitted, but that whatever drinking was in-
volved, it was done in the presence and with the acquies-
cence of Eyre. The issue of assumption of risk on 
intoxication was therefore a proper one. 
Plaintiff in his brief refers to Shoemaker v. Floor, 
117 Utah 434, 217 P. 2d 382. In that case this court 
specifically held that whether the guest had assumed the 
risk in connection with the driver's intoxication was a 
question of fact. 
The other phase of assumption of risk had to do with 
the defendant's conduct wholly apart from intoxication. 
However, even though the jury may not have found the 
defendant intoxicated, it was entitled to consider on the 
issue of wilful misconduct the fact that the defendant 
had been drinking. The plaintiff attempted to prove that 
the defendant was driving at a high rate of speed and 
crossed over the center line after coming down the north 
slope of Bennion Hill, colliding with the Giorgio vehicle; 
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that the defendant was not keeping a proper lookout and 
failed to have his vehicle under control. Most of these al-
leged actions would constitute mere negligence and not be 
sufficient for a recovery unless considered in connection 
with the defendant's alleged drinking, whether it actually 
amounted to intoxication or not. The evidence also 
showed that either on the trip down or back Massardi had 
made some mention about the defendant's speeding, to 
which the deceased Eyre replied not to worry because 
the defendant was a race car driver (R. 231, 232). 
If this occurred on the trip down, then both she and Eyre 
assumed the risk by failing to get out when they had the 
opportunity either at Riverton or on arrival at the ranch. 
Her testimony indicates that Eyre fully acquiesced as 
to the manner in which the defendant's vehicle was being 
operated. As further bearing upon the issue of assumption 
of risk, apart from the intoxication, was the scuffling 
episode which took place just before the accident occurred, 
and the fact that Eyre at no time complained or protested 
as to the manner in which the vehicle was being operated. 
On this phase of the matter the court gave two 
separate instructions, the same being Nos. 12 and 13, 
which in effect instructed the jury that even though 
they found the defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct, 
the jury would then have to determine whether the plain-
tiffs assumed the risk. These instructions properly set 
forth the law on assumption of risk. For a person to 
manifest his assent to h~gh speed when the same was 
called to his attention by merely indicating not to worry, 
that the driver was a race car driver, manifest a consent to 
a dangerous conduct. Furthermore, knowledge on the 
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part of Eyre as to the nature and extent of any drinking 
by the defendant, whether it resulted in intoxication or 
not, was sufficient, coupled with this incident of alleged 
racing, to entitle th~ jury to find that Eyre assumed the 
risk of the manner in which the vehicle was being oper-
ated. Certainly there was enough evidence in the case on 
the question of assumption of risk when coupled with the 
fact that no complaints or protests were made by either 
Eyre or Massardi, to make an issue of fact for the jury. 
Even in the case of Stack v. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 
P. 2d 594, this court held that there was an issue of fact 
on assumption of risk which was properly submitted to the 
jury and this court refused to reverse the jury's finding 
thereon. The court did not state as a matter of law that 
the plaintiff had not assumed the risk, but merely that a 
jury question was involved. We have the same situation in 
our present case. A jury question was involved, appro-
priate instructions were given, and the jury found against 
the plaintiff. There was no reversible error. 
Plaintiff complains that three separate instructions 
were given on assumption of risk. There were two phases 
of this question, assumption of risk in connection with 
wilful misconduct and assumption of risk in connection 
with intoxication. Instructions on each of these phases 
were essential. The court gave only one instruction on 
assumption of risk in connection with the intoxication, 
but two instructions in connection "rith wilful miscon-
duct, neither of which was in conflict "'"ith one another 
and the giving of which could not amount to prejudicial 
error. As a n1atter of fact, the court in several instances 
repeatedly advised the jury that they could find for the 
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plaintiffs in the event of wilful misconduct or intoxica-
tion. In instruction No. 1, the court in two separate 
places informed the jury that both the plaintiff Massardi 
and the plaintiff Eyre claimed that they were entitled to 
recover because of wilful misconduct and intoxication 
and that the defendant denied he was guilty of wilful mis-
conduct or that he was intoxicated. Instruction No. 5 
defined wilful misconduct and Instruction No. 6 gave 
the elements necessary to find intoxication. Instruction 
No.7 indicated that a guest could recover for wilful mis-
conduct or intoxication, and in addition thereto, reiter-
ated the claims of the respective plaintiffs that the 
defendant was intoxicated and. guilty of wilful miscon-
duct and informed the jury that if the plaintiffs should 
prevail as to either the issue of intoxication or wilful mis-
conduct, they were entitled to damages. Again, in In-
struction No. 16, the court advised the jury that the 
plaintiffs could recover for wilful misconduct or intoxica-
tion. We submit that the court repeatedly indicated to 
the jury that the issues involved wilful misconduct and 
intoxication and that the plaintiffs were entitled to re-
cover on either or both of these bases. The giving of the 
instructions on assumption of risk in connection with 
either the intoxication or the wilful misconduct was not 
confusing or misleading to the jury and did not constitute 
any reversible error. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY THAT CO~NTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTIO·N 
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BASED ON WILFUL MISCONDUCT AND INTOX-
ICATION. 
This is a new ground, nowhere stated in the plaintiff's 
statement of points as required under the rules (R. 134, 
13 5 ) . For this reason alone this point is en titled to no 
consideration. However, we consider it trivial in any 
event and certainly not prejudicial error. In Instruction 
No. 7 the court stated: 
cc::. ::· ::· If the plaintiffs should prevail in your 
finding as to either the issue of intoxication or that 
of wilful misconduct as a proximate cause of in-
juries or damages suffered by them, they will be en-
titled to recover damages unless they, or either of 
them, are barred from relief by contributory neg-
ligence, if any, or by an assumption of the risk, if 
such there was under the instructions given you." 
The complaint is made of this instruction on the ground 
that contributory negligence is no defense to an action for 
wilful misconduct. Assuming for the sake of argument 
that this is a correct statement of the law, nonetheless 
there was no prejudicial error. The only conduct of which 
complaint was made or which was shown in the evidence 
was the failure to complain or protest as to the de-
fendant's driving, riding with a person whom he knew or, 
in the exercise of due care, should have known was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, or at least had been 
drinking, acquiescing in the operation of a vehicle at a 
high rate of speed and justifying the same b,ecause the 
defendant was a race car driver, and scuffling between 
the deceased and Massardi which interfered with the 
driver's control of the vehicle. This was the conduct on 
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which it was claimed that the deceased was precluded 
from recovery, regardless of any wilful misconduct or 
intoxication on the part of the defendant. This conduct, 
regardless of what name or style called - contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk- was sufficient, if 
believed by the jury, to preclude the plaintiff from 
recovertng. 
The fact that the court used the term contributory 
negligence could in no manner have prejudiced the plain-
tiff because the only conduct on which there was any evi-
dence in the case was sufficient to preclude a recovery on 
the plaintiff's part if, in fact, believed by the jury. There 
has been confusion in the courts, including our own Su-
preme Court, on the use of the term contributory negli-
gence in describing the plaintiff's conduct under our own 
guest statute. We refer in particular to the case of Esernia 
v. Overland Moving Company, 206 P. 2d 621, which was 
decided under our guest statute. In that case both parties 
and the court in speaking of the guest's conduct, used 
the term ((contributory negligence" and in the article 
referred to from the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
again in speaking of the guest conduct, the term ((con-
tributory negligence" was used. However, in that case, 
as in this, it makes little difference by what term the 
conduct is characterized. The plaintiff's actions in the 
Esernia case in riding with a person known to be sleepy 
would bar the plaintiff's recovery for an accident occurr-
ing when the driver went to sleep whether the term con-
tributory negligence or some other term. were used in de-
scribing the conduct. So in our case, the conduct of the 
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plaintiff of which complaint was made, was sufficient to 
preclude such a recovery regardless of the term or name 
by which it was designated. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully sumitted that the plaintiff was ac-
corded a full and a fair trial; that the jury was properly 
instructed on the issues of law presented by the evidence; 
that there was no prejudice at all accorded to the defen-
dant in the court's instructions. The jury's verdict should, 
therefore, be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG 
Attorneys fer Defendant and 
Respondent 
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